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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) on 
employment retention and advancement.  The WFTC, which replaced Family Credit 
in October 1999, supplemented earnings of low paid workers living in low income 
families.  It was designed to increase the financial incentive for low skilled workers to 
find and remain in work and in the process boost their family income.  It finds 
evidence that WFTC increased employment retention among male recipients.  WFTC 
does not appear to have increased wage growth compared with Family Credit but 
there is no evidence that employers were able to use the more generous WFTC to keep 
wage growth down. 
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1 Introduction 
The 1980s and early 1990s saw large increases in earnings and income 
inequality and the distribution of work across households. These factors 
contributed to large increases in child poverty, so that by 1997 about a third of 
all British children lived in relative poverty (Gregg, Harkness and Machin, 
1999). The predominant reason for this was the absence of work in these 
families coupled with benefit levels which were insufficient to lift them out of 
poverty. Roughly one fifth of children lived in households with no adult in 
work and poverty rates among these households were very high. The reasons 
for this situation are disputed, for many, the gains from entering work were 
very low. Low skill levels often meant that the wage an individual would 
receive on entering work would be low. In addition, with the loss of benefits, 
many households would actually be worse off if they entered work, especially 
taking into account childcare costs. It was these disincentives to work that the 
Labour government sought to change with the introduction of Tax Credits and 
various other labour market policies.  
 
The underlying principle behind much of the Government’s welfare reform has 
been based on a ‘work-first model’. Here the assumption is that any job is 
better than no job at all. In contrast the ‘human capital model’ promotes 
education and training on the basis that this would provide a higher entry point 
to the labour market, improve job retention and progression. The emphasis on 
the work-first model reflected the direction of welfare reform in the US. In the 
US out of work individuals are left with very little choice other than to accept 
any available job, in the UK, up to a point, individuals have a greater degree of 
choice. Welfare reform designed to decrease the number of individuals out of 
work and claiming benefits has (a) tightened up out of work benefit 
entitlement, restricting the criteria for eligibility and duration entitlement 
[JobSeeker’s Allowance/New Deals] and (b) increased the financial incentive 
to take ‘unattractive’ jobs [in work benefits/tax credits/NMW] otherwise 
known as ‘making work pay’. Understandably the incentive has been to move 
as many people off benefits as possible and while the work first approach may 
have the greatest short term gains, in the long term it may be counterproductive 
and financially inefficient. This would particularly be the case if it was found 
that individuals cycle through welfare programmes interspersed with low paid 
jobs supported through high rates of in-work benefits. There has also been 
some concern that whilst in the past there was a financial disincentive to find 
work, through the introduction of generous in-work benefits individuals may 
now have become trapped in low paying poor quality jobs as a result of 
financial disincentives to progress and move off in-work benefits. 
 
Over the last 20 years a number of policy changes have been made to in work 
benefits in the UK. The two most financially important in-work benefits are 
wage supplements and assistance with housing costs. In terms of impacting on 
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the welfare to work transition perhaps the most significant have been the move 
from Family Income Supplement (which had been introduced in 1971) to 
Family Credit in 1988 and then the introduction of WFTC in 1999. These 
policy changes affected both eligibility rules (generally increasing the number 
of eligible low paid workers) and also the amount of benefit received for 
different working hours/wage combinations. This had fairly significant impacts 
on the work incentives for certain groups of individuals, which in turn appear 
to have impacted upon their employment rates. For example, Gregg and 
Harkness (2003) find that the introduction of WFTC raised lone parent 
employment by 7 percentage points. Interaction with Housing Benefit remains 
important and for some groups results in very little initial gains from finding 
work. However, little research work has been done on the transition rates of 
individuals into work and their subsequent job retention and advancement. 
 
In this project we aim to get a better understanding of which factors make 
ladders out of benefit dependency sustainable in the long term. We know from 
existing research on low wage dynamics that for some individuals low paid 
jobs act as stepping stones to better paid jobs while others become trapped in 
either long periods in low pay or cycling between low pay and no pay. We are 
interested in extending this research to consider how in work benefits interact 
with low pay dynamics. We will examine how different groups of individuals 
fare with a focus on gender, age and cohort groups. Finally, we will analyse the 
impact of policy changes on progression. We shall concentrate on tax credits so 
before moving onto the analysis we provide some background on the system of 
tax credits in the UK and review the research evidence on the impact of tax 
credits on employment. 
 
2. Tax credits 
The Working Families Tax Credit was introduced in October 1999 and was 
phased in over a six month period. The WFTC was not a completely new 
innovation. Family Credit (FC), a system of in-work support, was already in 
place and the WFTC took on essentially the same design. However, WFTC was 
significantly more generous; spending on FC in 1998/99 was £2.4bn but this 
rose to £6.3bn in 2002/03 under WFTC. Furthermore the payment mechanism 
changed. FC was paid directly as a cash benefit to the primary carer but from 
2000 WFTC was paid by the employer through the pay packet, with employers 
reimbursed by the Inland Revenue1
                                              
1  There was some variation in the payment method. Couples could elect for the credit 
to be paid directly to the primary carer in response to concerns about the distribution 
of income within families (the purse versus wallet debate). The self-employed 
received the credit direct from the Inland Revenue. 
. Only working families with dependent 
children were eligible to claim WFTC or FC.  
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Eligibility for WFTC was dependent on hours of employment, the number of 
children, net income and capital of the family and childcare costs. To qualify, 
an adult in the family had to work at least 16 hours a week in paid employment. 
Families with a net income below a certain threshold (£90 a week in October 
1999) would receive the maximum amount of WFTC. This maximum amount 
varied with the number and ages of children in the family. Any increases in net 
income above this income threshold reduced the amount of WFTC at a rate of 
55%. So for every extra £1 earned over the threshold (after income tax and 
national insurance) the family would experience a 55 pence fall in WFTC 
payments. At some level of net income the family would not be eligible for any 
WFTC. As WFTC was counted as income in the computation of Housing 
Benefit entitlement it was often difficult for a family to assess their final 
income should their circumstances change. 
 
If an adult worked over 30 hours a week a small extra payment was made. 
Financial assets over £3000 reduced the amount of credit and families with 
savings of over £8000 were not eligible for any credit. Families were assessed 
for WFTC every six months, with the onus on the family to inform the Inland 
Revenue of any changes in circumstances. 
 
WFTC was more generous than FC in a number of dimensions. The maximum 
amount of credit was higher, the net income threshold at which a family would 
be fully eligible was higher but perhaps most importantly the rate of credit 
withdrawal was lower at 55% compared to 70% under FC (although taking 
income tax and national insurance into account the implicit tax rate was 69%, 
Lydon and Walker (2005)). From 1994 a disregard was introduced in FC for 
help with the costs of certain forms of childcare but was of no benefit for the 
poorest families on maximum credit. WFTC provided significantly more 
generous support for childcare. Families could claim an additional childcare tax 
credit of 70% of formal childcare costs up to £100 a week for those with one 
child to £150 a week for those with two or more children (for couples both 
must be working at least 16 hours a week) and this was coupled with increases 
in the disregard for childcare costs for the purposes of calculating entitlement 
to Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
 
In April 2003 the system of WFTC was abolished and replaced with the 
Working Tax Credit (WTC) and the Child Tax Credit (CTC). The receipt of 
CTC is not dependent on employment status and is paid to the primary carer. 
WTC essentially has the same features of WFTC but is more generous still. 
The credit amounts and income thresholds were again increased and the credit 
withdrawal taper was further reduced to 37%. Assets were no longer 
considered when calculating entitlement and child support payments are not 
taken into account. In addition, the eligibility was extended to those 25 years or 
older on low incomes without dependent children. The period of eligibility 
assessment was increased from the previous six months to the previous tax 
year; which contributed to some of the subsequent problems of over-payment. 
4 
 
The idea was to align the payment as closely as possible with the tax system 
and responsibility was moved from the Department of Work and Pensions to 
the Inland Revenue (now HMRC).  
 
In the statistical analysis we present below we concentrate on comparing 
outcomes for recipients of WFTC with FC recipients and, therefore, we present 
findings up to April 2003. 
 
3. Employment effects of Tax Credits 
There is a growing body of academic research analysing the employment 
impacts of the WFTC. Despite these studies varying in their methodology and 
time period of analysis, the consensus is that the WFTC raised employment 
among the target groups. Most of the work examines the impact on lone 
parents’ employment, one of the biggest beneficiaries of the WFTC, but some 
studies also examine the impact on couples with children.  
 
Lone parent employment grew strongly over the period in which WFTC was 
introduced. However, it had been growing strongly since the UK came out of 
recession in 1993. The main difficulty in assessing the effect of WFTC is that 
we do not know what would have happened to employment in the target groups 
in the absence of the policy change (the counterfactual). For example, 
employment may have grown strongly among lone parents even if the WFTC 
had not been introduced. The typical way in which researchers attempt to 
overcome this problem is to pick a comparison group (e.g. single adults without 
children) and calculate any change between the two groups. The estimated 
impact of the policy change is therefore based on the assumption that any 
change in the differential is due to the policy and this may not always be true.  
 
The first paper to examine employment effects was by Brewer and Gregg 
(2001). They examined the impact on lone parents’ employment, using single 
adults without children as a comparison group, and found that the WFTC raised 
the employment rate of lone parents by about 1.4 percentage points. However, 
because they only had access to data up to Summer 2000 the statistical 
robustness of these results was low. Gregg and Harkness (2003) also examined 
lone parents and used the same comparison group. They found a larger effect 
on employment of 5 percentage points and also an increase in hours of work 
among those lone parents in employment. Leigh (2004) finds a smaller, albeit 
positive impact on work among lone parents and women in couples of around 1 
percentage point. He also reports an increase in hours of work of one hour a 
week. Francesconi and Van der Klaauw (2004) find a much larger positive 
impact on employment among lone parents of 7 percentage points, driven by an 
increase in flows into employment but also by a decline in flows out of work 
among this group. They also report the biggest impacts among lone parents 
with a child under the age of five years.  
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Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of the WFTC is that of Blundell, 
Brewer and Shepherd (2005). They examine the impact on lone parents’ 
employment and also on couples with children. They point out that because 
other policies were introduced at the same time as the WFTC it is not possible 
to identify its impact in isolation. The most important of these other policies 
was the increases in child allowances for those on Income Support and Job 
Seekers Allowance. These would have the effect of reducing work incentives, 
particularly for lone parents. They report an increase in employment arising 
from the WFTC among female lone parents of 3.6 percentage points, or 60,000 
but view this as an under-estimate of the true impact. 
 
The results for couples are somewhat mixed, depending on whether the 
individual’s partner is currently working or not. For men and women without a 
working partner they find a positive impact on employment from the 
introduction of the WFTC. However, for those with a partner already working 
they find no impact on work, and indeed for men with a working partner they 
report a negative impact on work status. This is perhaps not as surprising as it 
may seem. For individuals with a working partner the increased generosity of 
the WFTC provides an income boost to the household that is not contingent on 
them working. Economic theory predicts that some of these individuals would 
stop working as a result of this income boost. The overall effect is a re-
distribution of work as individuals in workless households enter work and some 
of those in households with both adults working drop out of work. The overall 
effect of this is a fall in the number of workless households. 
 
Brewer, Duncan, Shepherd and Suarez (2006) examine the employment 
impacts by estimating an empirical model of labour supply (a model that tells 
us how individuals and households respond to changes in work incentives) and 
evaluate the impact of the WFTC using this model. They find a positive impact 
on employment of lone parents of about 5 percentage points, a negative impact 
of about 0.57 percentage points among women in couples and a positive impact 
of 0.75 percentage points among men in couples. The reductions in 
employment among women in couples are driven by those with working 
partners for the reasons given above. They go on to estimate that although the 
total number of jobs increases by about 80,000 the number of workless 
households with children falls by 99,000 due to this redistribution of work. 
 
One of the few studies that has assessed the impact of the WFTC on wage 
growth found that the WFTC has a positive impact on wage growth for 
individuals who became eligible with the introduction of the WFTC (and who 
were not eligible under FC) and were therefore on the taper, but a negative 
effect for individuals who received the maximum payment (Lydon and Walker, 
2004). They hypothesise that the positive impact could be due to employers 
using the wage subsidy to fund general training and individuals being in the 
position to accept such jobs paying below their reservation wage.  
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Another piece of research which has looked at within year earnings and income 
variability of WFTC recipients has shown that there is both a considerable 
amount of variability in earnings and many of the income components 
(including tax credit payments) on a month by month basis (Hills, Smithies and 
McKnight, 2006). While the number of families followed on a week by week 
basis was small, it does provide a warning against simply using point in time 
estimates of earnings and income among this low income group and 
strengthens the case for using annual information.  
 
4. Estimates of the impact of WFTC on job retention and 
advancement – the model 
We want to estimate the impact of tax credits on employment retention and 
advancement. As we do not have experimental data where a random sample of 
qualifying individuals were given tax credits and a random sample of 
qualifying individuals were not given tax credits, we have to use statistical 
techniques to attempt to estimate what individuals’ employment profiles would 
have been in the absence of tax credits (the counterfactual). We therefore have 
to estimate the counterfactual by identifying a number of different control 
groups and use statistical techniques to produce estimates of how tax credit 
recipients would have fared in the absence of tax credits. The main statistical 
method we employ is the Difference-in-Differences (Diff-in-Diffs) estimator. 
This estimator is often used to assess the impact of a treatment on an outcome 
variable in the absence of experimental data. In simple terms, the difference in 
the outcome between treatment and control groups before the treatment, is 
compared to the difference in the outcome between the same groups after the 
treatment. For example, the impact of an active labour market programme 
designed to move welfare recipients off benefit and into work can be assessed 
by comparing the outflow from the stock of claimants before and after the 
introduction of the programme compared with a group of claimants who were 
not eligible for the programme. From this simple example it is fairly obvious 
that the basic assumption underlying the Diff-in-Diffs estimator is that apart 
from the introduction of the treatment nothing else changed which had an 
unequal impact on the outcome variable for the treatment and control groups. 
This is often not the case and some attempt to control for other changes can be 
made by estimating the Diff-in-Diffs estimator in a multiple regression 
framework.  
 
More formally, abstracting from other regressors, the Diff-in-Diffs estimator is 
defined as: 
 
( ) ( )CtTtCtTtDID YYYY 0011ˆ −−−=δ , 
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where Y T Yand C are the mean outcomes for the treatment and control groups, 
respectively, and t0 and t1
5. Data 
 indicate time before and after the introduction of the 
treatment respectively. 
 
For the purposes of this analysis the outcome variables of interest are the 
probability of remaining in work and wage progression rates. Comparisons will 
be made between individuals who move off out of work benefit into work and 
receive in work benefits and those who do not receive in work benefits. We 
define the treatment as the introduction of WFTC in 1999. We estimate a 
number of different models including controls for age and entry wage position. 
 
The data used in this paper is the Lifetime Labour Market Database (LLMDB). 
For a fuller description, see CASEpaper 132. The LLMDB comprises of a large 
number of administrative data series that can be linked together. These data are 
derived from a 1% random sample of individuals drawn from National 
Insurance records for each tax year from 1978/79 to 2004/05. The database 
contains information on annual earnings from employment and spells of self 
employment and benefits receipt. Information is also held on date of birth, sex, 
postcode of home address, date of death (where applicable) and whether the 
individual is a migrant. We can build a unique picture of individuals following 
them through spells of employment, self employment, and benefit receipt over 
a substantial portion of their working lives.  
 
We have constructed a panel dataset that contains as much information as 
possible on individuals’ labour market status and earnings for each tax year 
from 1978/79 to 2004/05. It dataset contains information on an individual’s 
annual earnings for each tax year, whether they are self employed and whether 
they are in receipt of contributory benefits. However, within any given tax year, 
precisely when an individual is in any given state is unknown. 
 
To these data we have supplemented information on in work benefits; Family 
Credit and Working Families Tax Credit. We only have information on the 
receipt of these benefits from 1994/95 tax year. This limits our analysis 
somewhat but we still have a number of years to analyse FC and WFTC 
separately. For FC and WFTC we actually have the start and end dates of the 
spells on these benefits (rather than number of weeks in the year claimed as 
with the other benefits). This enables us to look more precisely at spell lengths 
on these in-work benefits and to see if there are any differences between the 
two. In addition, we also observe multiple spells on these benefits, so we can 
analyse those individuals that cycle on and off FC and WFTC.  
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6. The Results 
(a) Summary figures on Family Credit and Working Families Tax Credit 
As our data comprises of a 1% random sample of the population of Great 
Britain, as such it should provide an unbiased sample of those claiming FC and 
WFTC. In addition, we should be able to gross up to population figures by 
multiplying our sample numbers by 100 (since we observe 1 in every 100 in the 
population). To begin with we provide an analysis of the number of individuals 
claiming FC and WFTC, and some of their characteristics, and compare these 
to the official statistics published by HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC).  
 
Figure 1 presents the official caseloads for FC and WFTC for all claimants, 
couples and lone parents between 1988 and 2002. There has been a clear 
growth in the receipt of in-work benefits in Britain over this time period. In 
1988 there were roughly 250,000 individuals claiming FC, most of these were 
individuals in couple households. Through the early 1990s the prevalence of 
FC grew so that by 1999 when it was replaced with WFTC there were some 
800,000 individuals claiming. The introduction of WFTC brought a huge 
expansion in the number of claimants. By 2002 around 1.2 million individuals 
were claiming WFTC. This growth has occurred amongst both couples and 
lone parents. 
 
Figure 2 presents our figures on receipt of FC and WFTC for the period 1995 – 
2004. These figures look very similar to those in Figure 1 from the official 
caseload. This figure also reports the number of men and women claiming 
separately. Women make up about 60-70% of recipients. Note that our figures 
relate to those claiming WFTC and in work. So for a couple claiming we will 
observe the recipient in work for the purposes of the benefit.  
 
Table 1 then presents the age composition of those receiving in-work benefits. 
The majority of recipients are between the ages of 25 and 50. However, there is 
some evidence that the age composition has shifted over time. There appears to 
be fewer younger recipients and a shift towards somewhat older recipients in 
the last few years. 
 
Table 2 presents information on the family type of the recipient and who is the 
main earner in the household. These figures come from published statistics 
rather than our data since we do not observe household information. Most 
recipients are employees rather than self employed, but the proportion of self 
employed recipients roughly reflects the proportion in the workforce as a 
whole. Among claimants living in couples, the majority are in families where 
the man is the main earner. However, since most lone parents are women, they 
are the largest group of recipients overall.  
 
Figure 3 then presents the average value of the award in nominal weekly terms. 
This trended upwards through the period of Family Credit. However, since the 
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introduction of WFTC the average award has become more generous. Overall 
the money allocated to WFTC was much more than FC. These figures tell us 
that some of this extra cash went to the increased caseloads, and some on the 
increased generosity of each claim. These changes may well have important 
impacts on employment retention and advancement for in-work benefit 
recipients. 
 
(b) The duration of FC and WFTC claims 
We now turn to examine the duration of spells on FC and WFTC. Table 3 
presents information on the length of spells on in-work benefits. This shows us 
that the spell length is quite widely distributed across recipients. About 40% of 
all claims are between 6 and 12 months. However, more than 30% of claims 
last more than two years. So while the average duration of a spell is about 20 
months, this varies widely between different claimants, with some having only 
short spells on in-work benefits and some having very long spells. Tables 4 and 
5 present these distributions for men and women respectively. We can see that 
in-work benefit claims for women tend to last quite a bit longer than for men. 
In particular, there are significantly more women with spells lasting more than 
36 months and the gap appears to be widening. 
 
However, just looking at single spell durations may not tell us the whole story. 
It might well be that in-work benefit claimants are cycling on and off these 
benefits so that within a short time of a spell ending another one begins. Table 
6 shows there is some truth in this. While about 40% of those ending a claim do 
not have another one (at least in the period of our data), about 15-20% will start 
a new claim within 3 months and some 30-40% start a new claim within the 
next year. This suggests quite a high degree of repeat claims of in-work 
benefits and is somewhat worrying for those who would hope that in-work 
benefits provide a step up into better paid jobs. There do not appear to be any 
clear differences between the extent of repeat claims for FC and WFTC 
claimants. Tables 7 and 8 present the same information for men and women to 
examine if the incidence of repeat spells is different for the sexes. The results 
show a very similar pattern for men and women.  
 
(c) Transitions into work 
We have established that spells on FC and WFTC can last some time and 
furthermore many of those who do stop claiming will start a new claim within a 
short space of time. We now turn to look at transitions in more detail to see 
how effective in-work benefits are at helping job entrants to remain in 
employment. In particular, we shall examine differences in the effectiveness of 
WFTC compared to FC in terms of employment retention of new entrants. In 
order to do this we have to use our data in a slightly different way than we have 
so far. We create annual (tax year) records of employment for individuals and 
follow them over time. This allows us to examine those who are moving from 
non-employment into employment from one year to the next. We then want to 
examine what happens to these job entrants the following year, i.e. whether 
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they are still in employment or not. Specifically we want to compare those who 
enter employment and claim in-work benefits with those who enter work 
independently of in-work benefits and how this changes pre and post WFTC. 
The diagram below shows the sequence of transitions we are looking at. We 
take all those who are out of work in year t – 1, who then enter work in year t. 
Here they can either enter work on WFTC or not. We then compare outcomes 
in terms of whether these entrants are in employment in year t + 1. This is 
expressed as a percent of the original group of entrants who are still in 
employment.  
 
State at t-1 State at t State at t+1 
Non-employed 
Employed – FC/WFTC 
Employed? 
Employed – No FC/WFTC 
 
In terms of our difference-in-difference estimation described above we 
basically compare this employment probability for our in-work benefits 
entrants before and after WFTC introduction and for our non in–work benefits 
entrants before and after WFTC.  Here our treatment group is those entering on 
in work benefits and our control group those entering but not on these benefits. 
Before we proceed to the estimation results let us look at some descriptives on 
these transitions.  
 
Figure 4 presents the percent of those in non-employment in year t-1 who enter 
work in year t (note that this includes both employment and self employment). 
Around 13-15% of non-employed men and women enter work by the following 
tax year. This varies a little over the economic cycle. Figure 5 then presents the 
percent of these entrants who do so into Family Credit or WFTC. Roughly 5% 
of women entering work do so on FC and WFTC. The figure for men is higher 
at about 8% and this has risen since the introduction of WFTC to about 10%. It 
is possible that more men are entering work on WFTC because of its increased 
generosity over FC and therefore men now qualify for in-work benefits. It is 
this group of entrants that we want to compare with general job entrants to see 
if there is any difference in their subsequent employment retention rates. 
 
7. The impact of WFTC on employment retention  
We now turn to look at the issue of whether WFTC has led to greater 
employment retention than FC. For this we will use our difference-in-
difference estimation technique outlined above. In fact, we will use a regression 
adjusted version of this. To begin with it is informative to just look at the 
retention rates over time for those entering work on in-work benefits and those 
entering without these benefits. Figure 6 shows the percent of these entrants 
who remain in employment at year t+1 and Figure 7 for year t+2. We can see 
that employment retention is higher for those on in-work benefits. Over 85% of 
these FC/WFTC entrants remain in employment whereas retention rates are a 
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few percent points lower for other entrants. But the striking thing to note about 
this figure is that the retention rate appears to have risen after 1999 when 
WFTC was introduced. This first piece of tentative evidence suggests that 
employment retention may have risen with the introduction of WFTC. 
 
In order to establish how significant this apparent change in retention is we turn 
to our statistical model of difference-in-differences. This essentially compares 
retention rates in the periods before and after WFTC introduction for our 
FC/WFTC group and for the non-FC/WFTC group. This estimation allows us 
to test whether there is a statistical difference between these two groups in 
terms of the change in the retention rates. It also enables us to control for other 
factors that may be affecting the retention rates, such as age differences and 
even the entry wage.  
 
Table 9 presents the results of this estimation. The results are the estimated 
percent point change in the employment retention rate as a result of the 
introduction of WFTC. When estimating such models we need to make an 
assessment as to whether we have estimated a statistically significant result or 
not. Economists usually work with degrees of significance. We signify whether 
there is an apparent impact of WFTC using this convention.2
The results are quite striking. The WFTC appears to have increased job 
retention for males at least. It might be that we can also see this effect in terms 
of weeks worked in the year, rather than just employment spells. Table 10 
 Our results 
suggest a positive impact on retention from the WFTC for all entrants but this 
relationship is not quite statistically significant. When we estimate separately 
for males and females, we find no effect for females but a statistically 
significant impact for males. The results suggest that the WFTC increased the 
employment retention rate for males by about 2% points. 
 
Adding in controls for age does not change the results very much. However, 
when we add the wage at entry as a control the effects become even larger and 
have greater statistical significance. This specification is essentially comparing 
job entrants of the same age and same entry wage into FC/WFTC with those 
not on FC/WFTC. It allows us to control for changes in the characteristics of 
the treatment and control groups in terms of entry wages. As WFTC was more 
generous than FC, and therefore covers higher wage individuals, and we know 
that there is a positive relationship between employment retention and position 
in the earnings distribution, it is possible that employment retention estimates 
excluding controls for entry wage could overestimate the impact of WFTC 
 
                                              
2  The convention is to look for relationships that can be said to meet statistical 
significance at the 5% level. In table 9 we report * for 10% significance level, ** for 
5% significance level, and *** for 1% significance level. The latter is the most 
stringent criteria.   
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estimates the impact of WFTC on weeks worked. None of the estimated 
impacts are large and they are all statistically insignificant.  
 
Finally we turn to wages. One hope has been that getting people into work will 
lead them to make progress on the jobs ladder into better paying jobs. Here we 
look to see if the WFTC has resulted in greater wage growth. Figure 8 shows 
the percentage change in wages for job entrants one year after they entered 
work. This figure shows that, on average, wage growth is the same for in-work 
benefit recipients and non-recipients except in 1998 and 1999 when wage 
growth was higher for non-recipients. Table 11 reports the estimates from the 
diff-in-diffs model on the impact of WFTC on wage growth the year after job 
entry. Again the estimated effects are small and not statistically significant.  
 
8. Summary and conclusion 
Under Conservative governments from 1979 to 1997 there were growing twin 
problems of work poor households and increasing child poverty rates. When 
Labour came to power in 1997 they quickly introduced a raft of active labour 
market policies designed to increase transitions from welfare to work and to 
increase the earnings and household incomes and the most disadvantaged in the 
labour market. 
 
In this chapter we have focused on the Working Families Tax Credit which was 
introduced in 1999. This tax credit supplemented the wages of low paid 
workers living in low income families. WFTC was more generous than its 
predecessors (FIS/FC) and eligibility was increased through increasing the 
maximum earnings threshold and reducing the rate at which the credit was 
withdrawn. The objectives of the WFTC were to increase employment among 
the most disadvantaged workers by increasing the financial gains from working 
even in very low paid jobs, improving job retention by either making it possible 
for individuals to remain in very low paid jobs or, more optimistically, to use 
this first job as a stepping stone to better paid jobs. In addition, WFTC was 
designed to increase household incomes amongst this disadvantaged group 
where child poverty is particularly concentrated. 
 
The LLMDB provides a unique opportunity to track a large random sample of 
individuals between employment states, moves on and off in-work benefits 
coupled with a complete record of annual earnings. 
 
The introduction of WFTC resulted in a large increase in the number of 
individuals receiving in-work benefits and an increase in the average value of 
these awards. The LLMDB does not allow us to estimate the impact of WFTC 
in terms of increased flows into employment but other research has shown that 
WFTC increased employment particularly for some groups such as lone 
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parents. We focus our analysis on assessing the impact of WFTC on 
employment retention and wage progression.  
 
We find evidence that the WFTC increased employment retention among male 
recipients relative to retention rates observed among male Family Credit 
recipients. We find no evidence that WFTC improved wage progression, in 
terms of annual earnings growth in the first year after the start of a claim, 
relative to FC. But importantly there is no evidence that the more generous 
WFTC was being used by employers to keep wage growth down. This may or 
may not have been helped by the simultaneous introduction of the National 
Minimum Wage which placed a wage floor in the low wage labour market. 
 
Overall the evidence suggests the evidence suggests that WFTC benefited a 
larger number of low wage families with higher average awards and improved 
employment retention among male recipients without a detrimental impact on 
wage growth. The findings suggest that alternative policies are required to 
improve job progression; a job is a step in the right direction but is not an 
automatic leg-up onto a jobs ladder. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Official Number of Claimants FC and WFTC
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year
Th
ou
sa
nd
s 
('0
00
s)
All Couples Lone Parents  
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated claimants from LLMDB
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Figure 3: Average Value of Award FC and WFTC
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Figure 4: Job entrants
% entering employment from non-employment
10%
11%
12%
13%
14%
15%
16%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year
Males Females  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Figure 5: FC and WFTC entrants
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Figure 6: Employment Retention and In-Work Benefits
 % of entrants in employment in year t + 1
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Figure 7: Employment Retention and In-Work Benefits
 % of entrants in employment in year t + 2
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Figure 8: Wage growth and In-Work Benefits
 % wage change for new job entrants
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Age Group 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
   <20 0.43 0.42 0.38 0.79 0.73 0.59 0.7 0.64 0.51 0.58
 20-24 8.3 7.37 7.38 6.84 7.22 6.57 6.26 6.82 6.86 6.92
 25-29 13.87 13.93 14.18 13.15 12.58 12.34 11.27 10.55 9.76 10.02
 30-34 28.86 28.63 28.48 28.71 28.08 27.75 27.87 27.27 25.65 21.6
 35-39 22.95 23.34 23.15 23.45 23.91 24.87 24.73 25.16 25.64 22.2
 40-44 14.56 15.42 14.96 15.9 16.14 16.5 17.24 18.07 18.68 19.18
 45-49 7.45 7.41 7.71 7.08 7.35 7.33 8.05 7.67 8.86 10.67
 50-54 2.57 2.42 2.7 3.04 2.69 2.85 2.82 2.86 2.87 5.23
 55-59 0.75 0.86 0.88 0.9 1.06 0.98 0.85 0.81 0.95 3.02
   60+ 0.26 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.24 0.57
Table 1: The age profile of in-work benefit claimants
 Percent of claimants in different age categories
 
 
 
All Employees Self Employed
All cases 1,376.3 1,245.5 130.8
Couples 639.0 542.6 96.4
Male main earner 514.7 427.7 87.0
Female main earner 124.3 114.8 9.5
Lone parents 737.3 702.9 34.3
Male 30.7 25.2 5.5
Female 706.6 677.8 28.8
Table 2: Recipients by Family Type and Main Earner
 
Source: WFTC and FC Quarterly Enquiry, UK WFTC recipients (thousands), November 
2002 
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1995 1997 1999 2001
    <3 months 0.01 0.16 0.12 0.27
   3-6 months 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.35
  6-12 months 40.85 46.08 39.96 40.09
 12-18 months 17.03 18.29 15.37 19.6
 18-24 months 10.37 9.24 8.99 14.06
 24-36 months 11.63 10.41 11.9 11.23
   36+ months 20.06 15.79 23.52 14.4
Table 3: Duration of FC and WFTC claims
% in different duration categories
  
 
1995 1997 1999 2001
    <3 months 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.51
   3-6 months 0.1 0.09 0.15 0.48
  6-12 months 44.41 49.86 44.34 45.33
 12-18 months 17.19 18.74 14.83 19.7
 18-24 months 9.83 8.68 9.12 15.72
 24-36 months 10.94 9.55 11.62 10.46
   36+ months 17.49 12.89 19.9 7.81
Table 4: Duration of FC and WFTC claims - Males
% in different duration categories
 
 
1995 1997 1999 2001
    <3 months 0 0.14 0.19 0.07
   3-6 months 0 0 0.13 0.25
  6-12 months 38.01 43.17 36.9 36.02
 12-18 months 16.91 17.95 15.75 19.52
 18-24 months 10.81 9.66 8.89 12.78
 24-36 months 12.18 11.06 12.1 11.83
   36+ months 22.1 18.02 26.05 19.52
Table 5: Duration of FC and WFTC claims - Females
% in different duration categories
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1995 1997 1999 2001
No spell 40.48 39.55 38.46 47.81
<1 month 6.01 6.65 9.24 10.3
1-3 months 7.49 8.29 9.26 10.68
3-6 months 7.59 7.89 8.02 7.4
6-12 months 11.69 10.65 12.64 10.34
12-18 months 5.71 5.32 5.81 5.14
18-24 months 3.53 3.6 4.08 3.49
24-36 months 4.66 6.88 4.78 3.18
36-48 months 3 3.96 3.78 1.62
>48 months 9.84 7.21 3.94 0.03
Table 6: Repeat Spells of In-Work Benefits
% of those ending a spell who start new spell
 
 
1995 1997 1999 2001
No spell 39.08 39.23 38.94 51.9
<1 month 6.94 7.22 8.46 10.5
1-3 months 8.02 8.87 9.98 9.6
3-6 months 8.88 7.45 8.37 7.6
6-12 months 11.88 11.07 14.04 10.01
12-18 months 6.01 4.94 6.46 4.59
18-24 months 3.79 3.61 4.16 2.56
24-36 months 4.51 6.86 4.65 2.24
36-48 months 1.79 4.66 2.59 1
>48 months 9.09 6.08 2.35 0
Table 7: Repeat Spells of In-Work Benefits - Males
% of those ending a spell who start new spell
 
 
1995 1997 1999 2001
No spell 41.67 39.81 38.12 44.14
<1 month 5.21 6.17 9.79 10.13
1-3 months 7.05 7.8 8.76 11.65
3-6 months 6.5 8.26 7.77 7.22
6-12 months 11.52 10.3 11.66 10.63
12-18 months 5.45 5.64 5.35 5.64
18-24 months 3.31 3.6 4.02 4.34
24-36 months 4.78 6.89 4.88 4.03
36-48 months 4.04 3.37 4.6 2.17
>48 months 10.48 8.14 5.05 0.06
Table 8: Repeat Spells of In-Work Benefits - Females
% of those ending a spell who start new spell
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All Males Females
Basic model no 
controls 1.48% 2.07% * 0.23%
Controls for Age 1.28% 2.03% * 0.25%
Controls for age 
and entry wage 2.81% *** 3.05% *** 1.98%
Table 9: Impact of WFTC on employment retention
% point change in retention rate due to WFTC
 
 
 
All Males Females
Controls 
for age -0.91% 0.38% -3.94%
Table 10: Impact of WFTC on weeks worked
% point change in weeks worked due to WFTC
 
 
 
All Males Females
Controls 
for age 0.63% 0.72% -0.69%
Table 11: Impact of WFTC on weekly pay
% point change in weekly pay worked due to WFTC
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
